We propose an improved autocorrelation function (ACF)-based image watermarking that is robust to combined geometric and removal attacks. ACF-based watermarking is thought of as one of the most effective watermarking schemes that resist geometric attacks. In this watermarking scheme, the autocorrelation peaks of the watermark play an important role for geometric attack estimation. The peaks, however, are vulnerable to attacks. The proposed scheme enhances the performance of ACF-based watermarking by improving the strength of the peaks. The information of an original image is used at the embedding time, so that the detector can extract strong autocorrelation peaks. Experimental results show that the proposed scheme yields better robustness than conventional ACF based watermarking against combined geometric-removal attacks.
Introduction
Recently, digital watermarking has attracted attention as a possible solution for the multimedia copyright protection. 1, 2 Digital watermarking is a process of hiding copyright information in multimedia data. To be effectively used for the copyright protection, digital watermarking should satisfy the following requirements: unobtrusiveness and robustness. Unobtrusiveness means that watermark embedding should not affect the quality of data. Robustness refers to the requirement that embedded watermarks should be detected reliably even after some attacks.
In the digital watermarking world, geometric attacks are regarded as very strong and harmful attacks. In most watermarking schemes, including the spread spectrum watermarking, 3, 4 the synchronization of an embedded watermark with the reference watermark is crucial for the watermark detection. Geometric attacks prevent watermark detection by desynchronizing the embedded watermark. Even slight rotation or scaling of the marked image can cause watermark detection failure if the watermark detector does not have a synchronization mechanism.
One watermarking method that handles geometric attacks is to embed a watermark into a geometric-invariant domain. The Fourier-Mellin-transform-based method 5, 6 belongs to this approach. This method seems to provide a nice solution theoretically. The implementation, however, is quite difficult because the perfect inversion of the FourierMellin transform is impossible. Due to the same reason, the quality of the marked image is poor.
Feature-based watermarking is another watermarking scheme that resists geometric attacks. 7, 8 This method extracts geometric-invariant features, such as edges or corners, from an image and embeds a watermark according to the features. This method requires a stable feature extractor that always finds the same features even after the image has been processed. Such a feature extractor is not easy to design.
Template-based watermarking is also one of the watermarking schemes to address geometric attacks. 9, 10 In this scheme, a template is embedded into a host image in addition to an actual watermark. The template does not contain copyright information, but is used to estimate the applied geometric transforms. The watermark is detected after inverting the geometric transforms. This method has two failure modes. Any detection failure of the template or watermark leads to watermark detection failure. Moreover, attackers can easily remove templates since the template has no security.
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Autocorrelation function ͑ACF͒-based watermarking is yet another approach. [12] [13] [14] In this scheme, a periodic watermark pattern is embedded into an image. The periodic watermark makes periodic peaks in the ACF of the watermark. The geometric transforms that have been applied to the marked image are estimated by inspecting the pattern of the extracted peak. This scheme also has the two detection failure modes. For reliable watermark detection, both the autocorrelation AC peaks and the embedded watermark should survive attacks.
Watermarking systems are often required to resist combined geometric and removal attacks. The removal attacks refer to some processing that can remove or attenuate an embedded watermark signal. The printing-scanning process, which is one of the most popular geometric attacks, is also a kind of combined attack. During the printingscanning process, slight rotation or scaling of the image is inevitable. At the same time, analog-to-digital ͑A/D͒ and digital-to-analog ͑D/A͒ conversions, which are a kind of removal attack, are also applied. Thus, an image is affected by both the geometric attacks and removal attacks during the printing-scanning process. Another example is lossy compression. Since multimedia data have high capacity, they are generally compressed by a lossy algorithm to be stored or transmitted. Geometrically distorted images are also often stored after lossy compression. Lossy compression is also a kind of removal attack.
The watermarking schemes already introduced resist geometric attacks well. Nevertheless, most of them show poor robustness against combined geometric-removal attacks. Although ACF-based watermarking is known as the most effective method against such attacks, 15 it does not yet show satisfactory performance.
In this paper, we propose an improved ACF-based watermarking that is robust to combined geometric-removal attacks. A problem of ACF-based watermarking is that the AC peaks are not strong enough. Since the AC peaks are more vulnerable than an embedded watermark to attacks, the overall performance of an ACF-based watermarking is more dependent on the AC peaks. In this paper, we improve the robustness of ACF-based watermarking by enhancing the strength of the AC peaks. To achieve this goal, the proposed scheme uses the watermarking with a side information mechanism. 16 Contrary to conventional ACF watermarking, which simply adds a periodic watermark to a host image, the proposed scheme uses information of the host image more actively at the embedding time, so that the detector can achieve stronger AC peaks. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the problem of ACF-based watermarking and the basic idea of the proposed scheme to overcome it. Section 3 describes the detailed algorithm of the proposed method. Section 4 presents the experimental results showing that the proposed scheme provides stronger AC peaks and yields better detection results than previous ACF-based watermarking schemes. Finally, Sec. 5 provides concluding remarks.
Problem Statement and Basic Idea
The weak point of ACF-based watermarking is the vulnerable AC peaks. Figure 1 shows a comparison of AC peaks and watermark detector response. For this test, a basic watermark pattern is generated using spread spectrum coding 3 and is periodically embedded into an image. The embedded watermark is extracted using a Wiener filter 17 , and the AC peaks and detector response are examined. The figure shows that the AC peaks have much lower strength than the detector response. ͓The central peak in Fig. 1͑a͒ is always 1 because it is the zero-offset AC.͔ The weak AC peaks make ACF-based watermarking scheme less robust to combined geometric-removal attacks. Suppose a removal attack that is not strong enough to remove embedded watermarks, but is strong enough to delete AC peaks. If the removal attack is applied to the marked image that has been slightly rotated, then the watermark detection will fail due to the failure in the geometric attack estimation, even though the watermark signal still remains in the image. To avoid this kind of situation, we must improve the robustness of AC peaks.
To explain the basic idea of the proposed scheme, we must look into the simple mathematical model of the ACF of an extracted watermark at the detection process. It can be modeled as ͗wϩn,wϩn͘ϭ͗w,w͘ϩ2͗w,n͘ϩ͗n,n͘,
͑1͒
where ͗ ͘ denotes correlation operator, wϩn is the extracted watermark signal, w is the embedded watermark signal, and n is the watermark estimation error of the watermark extractor. Since n has no periodicity, only ͗w,w͘ is a meaningful term in Eq. ͑1͒. The other terms are interferences.
The proposed method improves the robustness of AC peaks by reducing the interferences introduced by n. This can be realized by adopting watermarking with a side information mechanism. Using the watermark extractor information and an original image, the watermark embedder can approximately predict the estimation error n that will be extracted by the detector. By processing the predicted signal to have high AC, the estimation error n also becomes meaningful for achieving strong AC peaks. Figure 2 shows the proposed embedding procedure. Instead of simple addition of a periodic watermark to an original image, the proposed method uses the original image more sophisticatedly during the embedding procedure. The detailed procedure is as follows.
Proposed Algorithm

Watermark Embedding
1.
A signal E is extracted from an original image I of size XϫY using the watermark extractor. In the proposed scheme, the watermark extractor uses the Wiener filter: Now, we explain the correlating process in step 3. vector R. This projection increases the correlation between R and each vector v n Ј. 19 Accordingly, the correlation between each vector also increases.
For an efficient correlating process, the reference vector should be selected carefully. If it is selected without consideration of the distribution of the segmented vectors, then the high correlation may not be achieved without excessive modification distortion.
The reference vector R is generated as follows. First, a bipolar vector is created for each segmented vector v n by bipolar mapping:
The reference vector R is generated by accumulating the bipolar vectors as
The generated reference vector reflects the distribution of the segmented vectors. For example, if the n'th element of the reference vector has positive value, then the segmented vectors are distributed more in the positive direction along the n'th axis. Thus, the reference vector has the direction to which majority of the segmented vectors are distributed. The correlating process can be performed with minor distortion with the reference vector.
The projections are performed as follows. For each vector v n , the reference vector is modified to have the same length as v n while keeping the original vector direction. This process is described as
Then, we have the difference vector between R n and v n :
The segmented vector v n is projected to v n Ј by
where ␣ d and n are global and local weighting factors, respectively. We use the NVF-based local weighting factor also here, is defined in the entire image as Eq. ͑5͒, and n is the corresponding segment of v n in . Figure 4 describes how a segmented vector is projected. By the effect of the local weighting factor, the vector is projected not in the direction of the difference vector d n but in the direction of the vector in the ellipse. Figure 5 shows the watermark detection procedure. The detection procedure is as follows:
Watermark Detection
1. The watermark is extracted from a marked image with the Wiener filter as in embedding step 1. The extracted watermark E w Ј may be a corrupted version of the mixed signal E w . 2. The ACF of the extracted watermark is calculated.
The ACF of a signal can be expressed as the convolution of the signal and its geometric inverse form. Thus, the fast Fourier transform ͑FFT͒ and the inverse FFT ͑IFFT͒ can be used to calculate the ACF to reduce the computing time. The normalized ACF is calculated by
where * denotes complex conjugate operation. 3. The extracted watermark signal E w Ј is restored to its original geometry using the AC peak pattern. 4. The restored signal is segmented into blocks of the size M ϫM , and all segments are accumulated. ͑The accumulated block is denoted by E f .) 5. A reference watermark pattern W r of the size M ϫM is generated with user key as in the embedding procedure. 6. The watermark is detected by calculating the normalized correlation ͑NC͒ between the accumulated signal E f and reference watermark W r . To handle shift attacks, the correlation between E f and W r should be calculated over all possible shift. This process can be performed with reduced time complexity using the FFT as in the step 2 as
Since only one shift is valid, only one correlation value is high in NC if E f is the correct watermark. Thus, the maximum value in NC is selected for the detector response ͑DR͒ and the final decision of the detection are made by
where is the detection threshold defined by ϭ nc ϩ␣ nc nc , ͑16͒
where nc and nc are the average and standard deviation of NC, respectively, and ␣ nc is a constant.
The ACF of the extracted watermark often contains high correlation values that are not correct peaks. For example, if the image is rotated, the border of the image forms a high AC line. We must find the correct peak information among these high AC values.
The peaks are detected in two steps. First, we find local maximums in the ACF. A small window slides over the entire ACF, and the local maximum in each window is selected. This process removes many high correlation values that are not correct peaks. After this preprocessing, we have candidates for the peaks. In the second step, we select correct peaks among the candidates by ACFЈ͑x,y ͒Ͼ acf ϩ␣ acf acf , ͑17͒
where ACFЈ is the result of local maximum selection; acf and acf denote the average and standard deviation of the ACF, respectively; and ␣ acf is a constant. Figure 6 shows a peak detection example. The peak was detected from the marked ''Lena'' image, which had been compressed ͑JPEG quality factorϭ50%͒ and rotated by 15 deg. In the figure, the calculated ACF has many high correlation values besides correct peaks. The proposed peak detector clearly detected the correct peaks from the ACF.
Experimental Results
Test Environments
To test the improvement by the proposed scheme, we compared the proposed scheme with an additive ACF watermarking scheme. Although previous ACF-based water- marking schemes use various masking models and watermark patterns, they follow the general additive embedding model:
IЈϭIϩ␣W, ͑18͒
where ␣ and denote the global and local weighting function, respectively. To create the same test environment, the same watermark pattern and masking function as described in Sec. 3.1 are used for both schemes.
Five images ͑''Lena,'' ''F16,'' ''Peppers,'' ''Fishing Boats,'' and ''Pentagon''͒ with a size of 512ϫ512 were used for the experiments. The size of the basic watermark block was set to 128ϫ128.
Threshold Selection and Analysis
To minimize the watermark detection error, the thresholds should be selected carefully. Generally, a false positive detection error is regarded as more serious error than a false negative error. A false positive error in the final detection step in Eq. ͑15͒ results in a false positive watermark detection error. A false positive error in the AC peak detection, however, results in the false negative error since it causes error only in the geometric attack estimation. Moreover, many false peaks are removed during the local maximum finding step in the AC peak detection process, and a small number of the false peaks may not affect geometric attack estimation. Therefore, the threshold for the detector response was set to higher value than for the AC peaks. For the experiments, ␣ nc in Eq. ͑16͒ and ␣ acf in Eq. ͑17͒ were set to 6 and 3.5, respectively.
We analyze the false positive error rates of the selected threshold parameters. For the analysis, we must determine the distribution of NC in Eq. ͑14͒ and ACF in Eq. ͑13͒. Since linear correlation of two random signals can be considered to be a mean of random variables ͓each random variable ͑RV͒ is the product of two random variables͔, as in Eq. ͑19͒, by the central limit theorem, linear correlation ͑LC͒ has Gaussian distribution. 20 LCϭ 1
Although normalized correlation has the normalization term, we assume that the central limit theorem also holds here. Thus, we assume that NC and ACF of the unmarked image to follow a Gaussian distribution. Figure 7 shows the distribution of NC and ACF for the unmarked ''Lena'' image. The figure shows that both data follow the Gaussian distribution. With the Gaussian distribution model, the false positive error rate of the watermark detection can be approximately calculated by
͑20͒
When ␣ nc ϭ6, the false positive error probability of the watermark detection is about 9.87ϫ10
Ϫ10
, which is low enough for general watermarking applications. In the same way, the false positive error probability of the AC peak detection is about 2.33ϫ10
Ϫ4 . Figure 8 shows NC, ACF, and their thresholds for a marked ''Lena'' image after a JPEG 50% compression attack.
Strength of Autocorrelation Peaks
First, we tested the strength of the AC peaks. The test images were marked by both schemes with variant embedding strengths. The average ACs on correct peaks except the center peak were shown in Fig. 9 . In the figures, the horizontal axis represents the marked image quality ͓peak SNR ͑PSNR͔͒ and the vertical axis represents the average AC value of the peaks. The PSNR values of the marked images were about from 35 to 44 dB. The figure shows that the proposed scheme yields much higher AC peak values than the additive scheme when the qualities of the marked images are same.
Watermark Detection Test
Detection test after stirmark attacks
In the previous section, we observed that the strengths of the AC peaks are much improved by the proposed scheme. Now, we must test whether this achievement results in actual detection performance improvement. For the test, each image was marked by both schemes to 38 dB in PSNR. The stirmark benchmark software 21 was used for the attacks. The stirmark is one of the most well known watermark benchmarking tools, which provides several watermark attacks as follows. ͑The number in each parenthesis is the number of attacks in each category.͒
Global geometric attacks (70): row column removing
͑5͒, cropping ͑9͒, flip ͑1͒, linear geometric distortion ͑3͒, aspect ratio change ͑8͒, rotation ͑16͒, rotation ϩscale ͑16͒, scale ͑6͒, and shearing ͑6͒. 2. Removal attacks (19) : median filter ͑3͒, Gaussian filter ͑1͒, sharpening ͑1͒, color reduction ͑1͒, frequency mode Laplacian removal attack ͑1͒, and JPEG compression ͑12͒. 3. Nonlinear geometric attacks (1) : random bending attack ͑1͒.
In this experiment, the watermark was detected after the marked images had been attacked by the preceding attacks. The applied geometric attacks were estimated by finding the periods and angles of peaks in two different directions. For example, to estimate aspect ratio change, we should find the periods of peaks in the horizontal and vertical directions. Table 1 shows the detection results after the stirmark attacks. Both schemes yielded good detection results. The proposed scheme failed in detection in only five tests among all tests, while the additive scheme failed in six tests. The proposed scheme showed better results against the geometric attacks than the additive scheme. The proposed scheme failed in three JPEG 10% compression ͑''Boats,'' ''F16,'' and ''Peppers''͒ and two random bending attacks ͑''Boats'' and ''Pentagon''͒. No detection failure occurred in global geometric attacks. On the other hand, the additive scheme failed in three rotation test ͑''Lena,'' ''Boats,'' and ''Pentagon''͒ and three random bending attacks ͑''Boats,'' ''Lena,'' and ''Pentagon''͒.
In the results, the proposed scheme shows slightly lower robustness to JPEG compression than the additive scheme. Because the correlating process also introduces distortion to the image, the watermark embedding strength of the proposed scheme should be little lower than that of the additive scheme to get the same marked image quality. As the Proposed  90  89  89  88  89  Additive  88  90  90  88  88 result, the detector response of the proposed scheme is slightly lower than that of the additive scheme. Nevertheless, the proposed scheme resisted JPEG compression to a 15% quality factor for all images and 10% quality for the ''Lena'' and ''Pentagon'' images. A JPEG compression quality of 15% is a high compression rate. The compressed images with this rate show poor visual quality. Thus, we think that it is sufficiently high robustness for general watermarking applications.
Detection test after combined geometric-removal attacks
In this experiment, the marked images were first attacked by the global geometric attacks of the stirmark software and then compressed by a JPEG quality factor of 50%. The watermark detection test was performed on the attacked images. Figures 10, 11 , and 12 show detection examples after JPEG compression combined rotation, aspect ratio change, and shearing, respectively. Figures 10͑b͒, 11͑b͒ , and 12͑b͒ show the peak detection result. In all tests, the proposed scheme shows clearer peak detection results. The proposed scheme can estimate the geometric transform easily with the detected peak pattern. On the other hand, the additive scheme fails to estimate the geometric transform in all tests. Figures 10͑c͒, 11͑c͒, and 12͑c͒ show the detector responses after the inverse geometric transforms. The figures show that the embedded watermarks still remain in the attacked images in both schemes in all tests. Although the detector responses of the proposed scheme are slightly lower than those of the additive scheme, they have sufficiently high values.
In these examples, the proposed scheme successfully detects the watermarks. The additive scheme, however, cannot detect the watermarks although the embedded watermarks still remain in the images.
The overall detection results after the combined attacks are shown in Table 2 . As shown in the table, the proposed scheme showed much better detection results than the additive scheme. The additive scheme failed to detect watermark in 120 tests among 350 tests, while the proposed scheme failed in only 56 tests. In some tests, for example, the linear geometric attacks of ''Pentagon'' image, the additive scheme showed better results than proposed scheme. In these cases, the additive scheme also failed in geometric attack estimation. Since the linear geometric attacks modify the image geometry very slightly, the additive scheme could detect the watermark without the inverse geometric transform due to its slightly higher detector response. Except in such special cases, the proposed scheme provided much better detection results than the additive scheme.
Conclusion
The vulnerable AC peaks are the major problem of ACFbased watermarking. The proposed method provides more robust AC peaks by adopting watermarking with side information mechanism in the embedding process. By sophisticated use of the information of an original image and the detector structure at the embedding time, the detector can obtain strong peaks. Experimental results showed that the proposed scheme provided stronger AC peaks than the additive method. In the detection tests using the stirmark attacks, the proposed scheme yielded better detection results than the additive scheme against geometric attacks, while both scheme showed pretty good results. In the experiment with JPEG combined stirmark geometric attacks, the proposed scheme showed much better detection results ͑about 28% more detection successes͒ than the additive scheme.
